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WHITE V. UNITED STATES:

TENTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS PARENTS

"CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION"

DEDUCTION FOR

SUPPORT PAYMENTS MADE DIRECTLY TO
MORMON MISSIONARY SON
INTRODUCTION

In May of 1981, the United States District Court for the District of
Utah held' that amounts paid by taxpayers directly to a travel agent and
their son for support during his period of Mormon missionary service
were not deductible as charitable contributions. 2 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that such payments constituted contributions "for the
use of' the Church within the meaning of the statute. 3 This holding
contradicts many general charitable contribution principles. Moreover,
the holding directly conflicts with a recent Tax Court ruling that disal4
lowed a charitable deduction under indistinguishable facts.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs, Don and Alice White, were members of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormon Church) when this action
was filed. It is the policy of the Mormon Church to have all young men
fulfill a two year mission beginning at about age nineteen. The primary
function of the missionary is to contact people and teach the doctrines
of the Church. For a two year period, the missionaries perform this
function full-time, six and one-half days a week.
To pay the expenses of each missionary, the Mormon Church reI. White v. United States, 514 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Utah 1981), rev'd, 725 F.2d 1269
(10th Cir. 1984) (Logan, J., writing for the Tenth Circuit).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Allowance of Deduction.
(1) General rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made
within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a
deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
(c) Charitable contribution defined. For the purpose of this section, the
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use
of ....
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes ....
3. White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1270 (10th Cir. 1984).
4. Brinley v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983) (Brinley 1).In Brinley I, the
plaintiff was not represented by counsel. After the White decision, the Brinleys retained
the services of the same counsel that represented the Whites. The Brinleys filed a motion
to reconsider in light of the new White decision. The Tax Court granted the Brinley's
motion, but affirmed the Brinley I opinion, and disallowed any deduction. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932 (1984) (Brinley II). The Tax Court held that the Brinleys should
not be allowed to take a deduction as unreimbursed expenses, and that the Mormon
Church did not manifest enough control over funds because the Brinleys transferred the
money directly to the son and travel agent.
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quests direct support from the parents of each missionary in an amount
it determines necessary to meet minimal living expenses. 5 Contributions in excess of this amount are regarded as personal gifts to the
6
missionaries.
In 1978, plaintiffs' son, Lyle White, was chosen to be a missionary.
The Whites sent $100 to Murdock Travel, Inc. to defray part of their
son's transportation expenses incurred during travel to his missionary
post. They also sent approximately $175 per month directly to Lyle to
help pay expenses for food, housing, transportation, proselytizing
materials, 7 recreation and personal expenses. Between November 16,
1978, and December 19, 1978, plaintiffs deposited $560 directly into
Lyle's personal checking account. Lyle was the sole authorized signator
on the account.
On April 15, 1979, the Whites filed a joint income tax return for
1978. They claimed no deduction for monies paid to Murdock Travel or
deposited in Lyle's account. 8 On September 21, 1979, plaintiffs filed an
amended return claiming a $795 charitable contribution deduction to
the Mormon Church. 9 The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) denied the
claimed deduction by notice of disallowance. The Whites sued for a refund in federal district court.
The District Court of Utah ruled in favor of the I.R.S.. The district
court held that the Whites' method of direct contribution to an unqualified recipient precluded the Church from having full control of the
funds and thus the opportunity to channel them to other objects.' 0
Plaintiffs appealed the decision.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows a deduction from adjusted gross income for charitable contributions.' 1 The
first such provision for a charitable contribution deduction appeared in
the War Revenue Act of 1917.12 Since its inception, the charitable contribution provision has been the subject of much controversy, stimulating increased statutory qualification. 13 From two sentences in the
original legislation, the provision has been transformed into a complex
5.

White, 725 F.2d at 1270.

6. Id. at 1270.
7. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1980) defines "proselytize"
as an attempt to convert a person to one's religion.

8. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1061.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1982). See supra note 2.
12. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201, 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
13. See generally Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309, 344-75 (1972); Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28
TAx L. REV. 37 (1972); Dye, PersonalCharitableContributions: Tax Effects and Other Motives, 70
PROC. NAT'L TAx A. 311 (1977); McDaniel, Federal Matching Grantsfor Charitable Contributions: A Substitutefor the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAx L. REV. 377 (1972); Stane, Federal Tax
Support of Charitiesand Other Exempt Organizations: The Need for a NationalPolicy, 1968 S. CAL.
TAx. INST. 27.
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statutory scheme. '
In its present form, section 170(a) allows a deduction for any charitable contributions made within the taxable year. "Charitable contribution" is defined in section 170(c) as "a contribution or gift to or for the
use of" various charitable organizations.1 5 Many eligible organizations
are also exempted from taxation under section 501(a). 16 However, not
every payment to an organization that qualifies as a charity is a charitable contribution. 17 To qualify, the donation must be:
8
1) a "contribution or gift";'
2) "to or for the use of" a qualified donee.
In order to fully understand the significance of the White decision, each
of these criteria must be examined in greater detail.
A.

Contribution or Gift

No definition of "contribution or gift" is contained in section 170.
Courts have fashioned a definition based on an examination of both the
common-law meaning of "gift" and their perception of congressional
motives for granting the charitable contribution deduction.19 In accordance with common-law principles, there must be a bona fide intent on
the part of the donor to make a gift. Additionally, the donor must not
receive any consideration in return, other than personal satisfaction
20
from the act of generosity.
Historically, there has been some confusion among the courts about
what type of donative intent is necessary to effect a deductible contribution. The confusion has resulted from the different focus of various
courts. Some courts have looked to the subjective intent of the taxpayer, while others have examined the objective value of the benefits
received by the taxpayer for making the gift. 2 ' To compound the confu-

sion, many courts have accepted one of these analyses in theory, yet
22
have applied another in their rulings.
The courts of appeals and the Court of Claims have developed
three methods of analysis in determining the intent of a taxpayer in making a contribution. 2 3 First, the subjective method was adopted by the
14.

BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION ON INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFTS

35.1.1 (1981) [here-

inafter cited as BITrKER].
15. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1982).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). See organizations listed at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1982).
17. Seed v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 265 (1971).
18. Most courts have held that the terms "contribution" and "gift" are synonymous.
See generally Hobbet, Charitable Contributions-HowCharitable Must They Be?, 11 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1-2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hobbet].
19. Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution or Gift"for Charitable Contribution Deduction
Purposes, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 973, 975 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Colliton].
20. Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1977). See infra note 82.
21. Hobbet, supra note 18, at 2.
22. Colliton, supra note 19, at 988-89. For a more detailed explanation of this problem, see Hobbet, supra note 18; Colliton, supra note 19; and Note, Deductions For Charitable
Contributions-An Objective Test, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 349 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SUFFOLK].

23. Colliton, supra note 19, at 990-91.
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Ninth Circuit in Dejong v. Commissioner.24 In Dejong, the court reviewed
payments to a religious school attended by the taxpayer's children. The
organization which ran the school, the Society for Christian Instruction,
charged no tuition. It did, however, furnish the parents with an estimate
of the costs of educating the children and requested the parents to contribute as much as possible. 25 Finding no helpful decisions interpreting
the terms "charitable contribution or gift" as used in section 170, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the test 26 used by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein.27 In Duberstein, the Supreme Court stated the famous
"detached and disinterested generosity" test. The Court held that "if
the payment proceeds primarily from 'the constraining force of any
moral or legal duty,' or from 'the incentive of anticipated benefit' of an
economic nature . . .it is not a gift. .

.

. A gift in the statutory sense,

on the other hand, proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested
generosity .... , "28
After quoting extensively from Duberstein, the Dejong court adopted
this subjective test for purposes of section 170 analysis. 29 Based on this
reasoning, the court disallowed as a personal expense the portion of the
contribution which reflected the cost of the children's education. 3 0 The
Dejong reasoning and test has been followed by the Second 3 l and
Tenth3 2 Circuits.

Second, the objective method of determining donor intent was best
outlined by the First Circuit in Oppewal v. Commissioner.3 3 The Oppewal
34
court followed an earlier case, Crosby Valve and Gage Co. v. Commissioner,
which had rejected the subjective test in Duberstein. The Crosby court reasoned that the "disinterested generosity" test would cause "an important area of tax law [to] become a mare's nest of uncertaintly woven of
'3 5
judicial judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary reality."
In reviewing facts nearly identical to Dejong, the First Circuit stated
the "fundamental objective" test by way of an awkwardly phrased question: "[H]owever the payment was designated, whatever motives the
taxpayers had in making it, was it, to any substantial extent, offset by the
24. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
25. Id. at 374-75. This methodology is somewhat similar to the method employed by
the Mormon Church in White. See White, 725 F.2d at 1270.
26. DeJong, 309 F.2d at 376-79.
27. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). The Duberstein decision involved the construction of the
term "gift" relative to the § 102(b) exclusion of gifts from gross income.
28. Id. at 285-86. (citations omitted) (quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.
34, 41 (1937) and Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).
29. DeJong, 309 F.2d at 379.
30. Id.
31. Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). In considering facts identical to Dejong, the court disallowed the entire amount paid into an educational fund of the
school attended by the taxpayer's children. The court found that the payment for tuition
was a nondeductible personal expense of tuition. Id. at 781.
32. Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
33. 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972), aft'gJacob Oppewal v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1177 (1971).
34. 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967).
35. Id.
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cost of services rendered to taxpayers in the nature of tuition?" 36 Utilizing this test, the First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court ruling which disallowed a portion of the money paid to the Society for Christian
Instruction for tuition. 3 7 The objective test has also been adopted by
38
the Seventh Circuit.
A third test was enunciated by the United States Court of Claims in
Singer Co. v. United States. 39 Singer, a manufacturer and distributor of
sewing machines, sold machines at a forty-five percent discount to various charitable organizations. Singer then claimed a charitable contribution deduction in the total amount of such discounts. The Court of
Claims rejected the subjective test of Duberstein and instead applied what
could be viewed as a "hybrid objective-subjective analysis." '40 The court
noted that in many cases "[i]f the transfer was made with the expectation
of receiving something in return as a quid pro quo for the transfer then in
41
such an instance the I.R.C. section 170 deduction [must be denied].
The Court of Claims found that Singer's predominant reason for granting discounts was the expected economic return in the nature of future
increased sales. 4 2 Thus the court concluded that the discounts were of a
43
business nature and were not charitable.
B.

To Or For The Use Of

A second qualifying criteria for a charitable contribution focuses
upon whether the contribution was made either "to or for the use of"
charitable organizations. 4 4 In determining whether a gift has been
made "to" a charitable organization, courts generally have required that
there be an actual payment to a qualified donee 4 5 or his agent and that
the donor relinquish full control of such payment. Contributions to individuals, as opposed to organizations, are not within the ambit of section 170(c). 4 6 The Supreme Court, reviewing a trust for charitable
public purposes, stated in Russell v. Allen 4 7 that charitable gifts must be
for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons. The element of in36. 368 F.2d at 1002. See SUFFOLK, supra note 22, at 349-50.
37. Jacob Oppewal v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177 (1971), affid, 468 F.2d
1000 (lst Cir. 1972).

38. Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1975).
39. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
40. Hobbet, supra note 18, at 6.
41. 449 F.2d at 422. The court stated its test:
It is our opinion that if the benefits received, or expected to be received, are...
greater than those that inure to the general public from transfers for charitable
purposes . . . then in such case we feel the transferor has received, or expects to
receive, a quid pro quo sufficient to remove the transfer from the realm of deductibility under section 170.
Id.
42.
43.
44.
45.
T.C. 1
46.
47.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 423.
26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
Mayo v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 505 (1971); Peace v. Commissioner, 43
(1964).
Mayo, 30 T.C. at 507.
107 U.S. 163 (1882).
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definiteness is one of the essential characteristics of a legal charity. 48
This test sheds light on a taxpayer's donative intent. When the donor relinquishes all control of a gift by giving it to an organization to
direct its distribution, it becomes clear that the gift was intended for use
in a manner consistent with the charity's purpose and direction and not
that of the donor. Charity has been held to begin where the certainty in
the beneficiary ends. 49 Whenever a beneficiary is designated by name,
and his merit alone is to be considered, the bequest becomes private and
not public. The gift thus loses the essential element of indefiniteness. 50
Hence, donations "to" a qualified charity are not deductible if the donor
retains some measure of control over the gift. By designating a specific
individual as beneficiary, the deductible nature of the contribution is de51
stroyed, no matter how worthy the individual.
Contributions to charitable organizations also qualify if made "for
the use of" the organization. 52 Included are payments made by taxpayers that further the organization's charitable activities, even when not
made directly to the organization, for example: unreimbursed expenses
incurred by volunteer workers. 53 These expenses are allowed as charitable deductions because the charity is directing the taxpayer in the rendition of services, and the expenses are incidental to the performance by
the taxpayer of such charitable services.
Against this legal background, the Tenth Circuit allowed taxpayers
to deduct payments to their son when such payments were used for the
son's support and living expenses during a religious mission.
III.
A.

THE CASE

The Trial Court Decision

In the action for an income tax refund, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 54 In considering these motions, the district court outlined the questions presented as whether: (1) monies paid
to a church-designated travel agent to defray their son's travel expenses,
and (2) monies paid directly to the son for support during the period of
missionary service were charitable contributions within the meaning of
section 170 of the Code, and hence deductible from adjusted gross
48. Id. at 167. For a detailed discussion of the public policy limitations on the availability of the federal charitable tax exemption, see Thompson, Public Policy Limitations on the
Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations, 2 TAx L.J. 1 (1984).
49. Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 443 (1943) (citing Russell v. Allen, 107
U.S. 163 (1882)).
50. Davenport v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585, 1587 (1975); Thomason v.
Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 443-44 (1943).
51.

Teitell, Earmarked Charitable Gifts, 117 TR. & EST. 439, 442 (1978).

52. The "for the use of" language was adopted by Congress to overrule a Treasury
Department decision, O.D. 669, 3 C.B. 187 (1920), which held that contributions in trust
for a charity were not deductible. Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(1 1), 42 Stat. 227,
241 (1921).
53.

BITKER, supra note 14, at

54.

White, 514 F. Supp. at 1057.

35.12.
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income.
The district court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment holding that the contributions made by the Whites were not
deductible. 5 6 Central to this holding was the finding that the contributions were made to someone other than a qualified recipient. The district court further stated that the Whites' reserved control over the gift
57
made it a private, not public, gift.

Recognizing that contributions may be deductible if received and
disbursed by an authorized agent of a qualified recipient, 58 the district
court held that because the funds were used solely for the support of
that agent, the gift lacked the required element of indefiniteness. 59 Because the donation lacked the required generality and indefiniteness, the
court held that the Whites had prevented the Church from exercising
control over the funds. 6 0
The district court then stated three public policy reasons for adhering to the plain meaning of the statute:
First, qualified charitable institutions are limited by Congress to
a particular class of institutions, the activities of which are specifically limited and are thought to be of benefit to society in
general. . . . Second, a limited number of pre-qualified charitable recipients are easier for the sovereign to monitor ....
Third, adherence provides assurance to the favored institutions
and, equally important, to the public that the opportunity for
abuse in the receipt and use of funds by persons who need not
institutions for their receipt and disbursement is
account to the
6
minimized. '
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the
case for further proceedings. 6 2 The court began its opinion by stating
that the holding did not depend on whether the Whites' contribution
was "to" the charity or "for the use of" the charity. 63 The court was
convinced from the outset that amounts contributed were at least "to
64
the use of" the Church within the meaning of section 170.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1061-62.

57. Id. at 1061.
58. Id. at 1060 (citing Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 444 (1943)).
59. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1060-61.
60. Id. at 1061.
61. Id.
62. White, 725 F.2d at 1272.
63. Id. at 1270. Presumably, the reason for making this statement was that under
prior tax law, contributions "to" a charity were eligible for an extra 10% deduction over
those "for the use of' a charity. See Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1982) where the Second Circuit held, in considering percentage deduction limitations,
that unreimbursed expenses were considered within the ambit of the extra 10%
deduction.
64. 725 F.2d at 1270. In choosing the words "to the use or' the court seems to have
misquoted the statute which reads "to or for the use of." See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1982).

338
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Citing Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-l (g), 6 5 the court stated
that the government's test of full fund control by the Church should not
apply to unreimbursed expenses of the taxpayer in performing services
for a qualified charity. 66 Instead, the court stated that the proper consideration should focus on the donor's intent. 6 7 The court then stated
the controlling test as "whether the primary purpose of the expenditure
was to further the aims of the charitable organization or to benefit the
spender."'68 Applying this test, the court followed a Tax Court case 69
which had allowed a missionary to deduct his travel and living expenses
while away from home.
The court then identified the main issue of the case as whether taxpayers may deduct the personal expenses incurred by their dependent
son but paid with their money. 70 Acknowledging Brinley,7 1 a case with
facts very similar to the case at bar, and I.R.S. Revenue Rulings 72 which
would deny the deduction on the ground that it was a gift to the son, the
court ruled that the payments were deductible. 73 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that there was no rational basis for distinguishing the payment
of expenses of a dependent son from the payment of a taxpayer's own
74
expenses in performing the same services.
Analogizing the facts as similar to a situation of parents supporting
their child, the I.R.S. had argued that such expenses were more personal
than charitable in nature and were thus non-deductible under section
262. 75 The court rejected this argument, stating that if "section 262
barred a deduction for expenditures made on behalf of a dependent
child, it would also bar a deduction for living expenses incurred by a
taxpayer while performing missionary services." 7 6 These expenses, the
court noted, were expressly allowed under Treasury Regulation section
77
1.262-1(b)(5) and Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-1(g).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1983) states as follows:
[U]nreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to an
organization, contributions to which are deductible, may constitute a deductible
contribution. . . . [O]ut-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily incurred
in performing donated services are deductible. Reasonable expenditures for
meals and lodging necessarily incurred while away from home in the course of
performing donated services also are deductible ....
66. White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
67. Id.
68. Id. Later in the decision, the court rephrased the test to be "whether the primary
purpose is to further the aims of the charitable organization or to benefit the person whose
expenses are being paid." Id. at 1272 (emphasis added). The reason for this change was not
given.
69. Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973).
70. 725 F.2d at 1271.
71. 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983). See supra note 4.
72. Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10. This ruling disallows such a charitable contribution as in the present case where the gifts were earmarked and not made to a general
fund or common pool.
73. 725 F.2d at 1271.
74. Id.
75. Brief for Appellee at 6.
76. White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.262(b)(5) (1983) provides that personal expenses "which include
transportation expenses, meals, and lodging" are deductible by the taxpayer "if incurred
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The court went on to distinguish cases denying deductions when
the donors earmarked a contribution to a person or defrayed expenses
of a person who would otherwise be dependent upon the charity. The
court stated that such payments "served the charity only by eliminating
the need of one possible object of the organization's bounty."' 78 Persons receiving such contributions were not serving the charity, as was
Lyle, but rather were beneficiaries of a service provided by the charity.79
The White opinion concluded by reiterating the primary purpose
test. 80 Without mentioning the district court's rule or reason, the court
held that the expenditures were deductible because the money primarily
served the Church. 8 1
IV.

ANALYSIS

The holding in White is flawed in that it extends beyond the wellsettled parameters defining charitable contributions. In light of established authority, the Whites, in making a direct payment to their son,
received a benefit greater than the act of generosity or the benefit flowing to the public; hence, the deduction should have been denied. The
claimed deduction should also have failed as a private gift; it was not
made to a qualified donee and was earmarked for one specific
individual82

A.

A Contribution or Gift

In Dowell v. United States,8 3 the Tenth Circuit adopted the subjective
donative intent test of Duberstein.84 A gift must proceed from disinterested generosity; it must be a voluntary transfer without consideration
other than the personal satisfaction of having performed an act of generosity. 85 In reviewing opinions which disallowed deductions, the Dowell
court approved decisions that disallowed any deductions because of
legal or moral obligations. The taxpayers were found to have expected
86
or anticipated a benefit in making a gift of this sort.
in traveling away from home" under conditions specified in subsection (g) of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1 (1983). See supra note 65 for contents ofTreas. Reg. § 1.70A-1.
78. 725 F.2d at 1271.
79. Id. at 1271-72.
80. Id. at 1272. See also supra note 68.
81. 725 F.2d at 1272.
82. The Tenth Circuit also erred by not deferring to the district court's interpretation
of the facts and conclusions of law as mandated by Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233
(10th Cir. 1977). The Dowell court also held that interpretation of intent or motive is reserved for the finder of fact and is not to be disturbed on appeal unless held to be clearly
erroneous. 553 F.2d at 1235, 1238 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). The Dejong court also
suggested that appellate review of determination of gifts must be restrictive and must
stand unless clearly erroneous. 309 F.2d at 376. No such finding was made in the White
reversal.
83. 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
84. Id. at 1238. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the subjective test.

85. 553 F.2d at 1238.
86. Id. at 1239.
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The parent-child relationship clearly creates at least a moral obligation to provide for a child's living expenses. The existence of a parentfor supchild relationship has been the basis for disallowing deductions
88
87
port in adoption cases as well as school tuition cases.
In McMillan v. Commissioner,89 the taxpayers claimed that one-half of
a $150 "adoption fee" was charitable and deductible. The court held it
to be a payment in furtherance of taxpayers' purpose of adopting the
child. The expenses incurred were those of a personal or family nature
and hence non-deductible. 90
In DeJong,9 1 the Tax Court held that the payments pledged and
made by the parents to help defray tuition expenses were not voluntary
and gratuitous contributions motivated merely by the satisfaction which
flows from the performance of a generous act. They were induced, in
which the parents sought and anticisubstantial part, by the benefits
92
pated from school enrollment.
If the luxury of a child's education can be found to create a personal
benefit to the parent, then certainly a well-nourished and sheltered child
also must create a personal benefit to the parents. The court of appeals
in White realized that the direct payment from the parent to the child
would create a greater incentive for church members to support a missionary from their family. 9 3 This incentive is not created by an intent to
further the work of the church but by the personal nature of the gift. A
satisfaction beyond the act of charitable generosity inures to such taxpayers-the satisfaction a parent derives in providing for a child.
A parent's moral and legal obligation creates the necessity of child
support. Regardless of where or what Lyle White was doing, his parents
94
would have provided support. The Fifth Circuit, in Or v. United States,
stated a test which, by analogy, applies to this situation. 9 5 In construing
insurance premiums a taxpayer paid on vehicles used, in part, for charitable purposes, the court held that such insurance would have been paid
even if the taxpayer had not done any charitable work at all. The court
stated that the definition of "gift" will not stretch to include payments
which would have been made for non-charitable reasons. The payments
were therefore disallowed as a charitable deduction.
Similarly, the Whites had at least a pre-existing moral duty to support Lyle. 96 The payments to Lyle for food and housing incidentally
87. See, e.g., McMillan v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1143 (1959).
88. See, e.g., Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); DeJong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1962); Cooper v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 889, 891
(4th Cir. 1959).
89. 31 T.C. at 1143.
90. Id. at 1147.
91. 36 T.C. 896, 900 (1961).
92. Id.
93. 725 F.2d at 1270.
94. 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965).
95. Accord Peace v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 1 (1964).
96. The Whites advanced a Fifth Circuit case, Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1060
(5th Cir. 1979), as support for taking a deduction. In Winn, a taxpayer was allowed a
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benefited the Church; however, the benefit to the Church was not the
main reason for the payments. In short, the payments would have been
made anyway. The personal benefit far exceeded the benefit, if any, that
inured to the public.

B.

97

To The Charity

By making the gift directly to an individual, the Whites destroyed
one of the essential elements of a charitable gift-indefiniteness. 98 Lyle
White and Murdock Travel, Inc., were not qualified charities under section 170(c); at best, they were agents of the Church. 9 9 However, because the payments were used by them and not given to the Church, any
Church control over the funds was precluded. The payments were private, not public, because the benefit was for the support and subsistence
of the son, and not the Church. The payments should have been disallowed due to the lack of Church control.
A plain reading of the statute, as well as the relevant case law, supports this conclusion. In Mayo v. Commissioner,' 0 0 the court disallowed
deductions for payments made directly to Mennonite missionaries
rather than through organizational channels. The court held that the
donee must be an organization designated in section 170(c).
In Morey v. Riddell,' 0 ' a case the Whites cited for support, the court
found that the payments were to the church although the checks were
made payable to four ministers. In so ruling, the court noted this was
10 2
the only way to contribute to the particular "church" in question.
The church had no distinct name, written charter, constitution, by-laws
or operational guide. 10 3 Moreover, the church maintained no permanent headquarters, did not maintain records, and its funds were not held
in a church designated bank account.' 0 4 The court also found that the
taxpayers clearly did not intend to make contributions to the ministers
individually, but placed the funds in the ministers' hands as agents for
10 5
the use of the church.
In Lesslie v. Commissioner,

°6

another case cited by the Whites, the

deduction for funds which were eventually channeled to his first cousin's checking account

to use in her missionary work. This case can be distinguished from White on several
grounds. Winn took no dependency deduction for her on his income tax return and decided to contribute to her missionary cause only after becoming disillusioned with several
other charitable organizations to which he had previously donated.

97. Thus the facts of Whiite satisfied the objective test. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.

99. Before proceeding on a mission, missionaries are ordained as ministers and may
perform civilly recognized marriages. Thus, as officers of the Mormon Church, they could

be found to be agents. Murdock is the travel agency exclusively used by the Church in
sending missionaries to their posts and could conceivably be deemed the Church's agent.
100. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 505 (1971).

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

205 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
Id. at 921.
Other than the Holy Bible. Id. at 919.
Id.
Id.
36 T.C.M. (CCH) 495 (1977).
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court allowed a charitable contribution deduction for a gift of a check to
a Presbyterian missionary. The Tax Court found it dispositive that the
money was not to be used for the missionary's personal use or even at
07
his discretion but rather was held in trust for the church.'
The majority of cases hold that even when payments are made to an
established organization, the charitable deduction is disallowed when
the donor designates an individual as beneficiary of the contribution. In
Tripp v. Commissioner,10 8 the court disallowed a deduction even though
the contribution was made to a common fund to be used in fulfilling the
organization's purpose of education. The fact that the payment was designated for one person, rather than being a gift to the college for an
indefinite number of persons, precluded qualification as a charitable
contribution.
In Thomason v. Commissioner,10 9 the court disallowed a contribution
to a children's home because the payments were earmarked for an individual."I 0 This case was cited and followed by the Tax Court in Davenport v. Commissioner,"'1 which disallowed a payment made to a
missionary's landlord. The Davenport court reasoned that it is irrelevant
that the church might have chosen to maintain the same residence. By
making payments directly to the landlord, the taxpayer took this option
from the church. 1 2 Because the payments were to an individual, the
court also found it irrelevant that the payments relieved the Church of
the necessity of paying for the residence.' 1 3 It is irrelevant that the
Mormon Church might have chosen to support Lyle. Because the payments were made directly to Lyle, the payments lost the requirement of
indefiniteness of bounty and prevented the Church from directing it
elsewhere if necessary.
B.

For the Use Of The Charity

The Tenth Circuit's opinion is premised on the following syllogism:
Lyle White incurred expenses while performing services for the Church;
the expenses were paid by his parents; hence, the Whites should be entitled to a deduction for the expenses because they were "for the use of'
the Church.
The plain language of Treasury Regulation section 1.170A- I (g) 114
allows a deduction for unreimbursed expenditures incurred incidentally
to the rendition of services by a taxpayer to a charity. The Whites did not
render any services to the Church, nor incur any expenses, and thus
107. Id.
108. 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964).
109. 2 T.C. 441 (1943).
110. Id. at 444-45. Again, a court disallowed a contribution even though it was meant
to fulfill the charitable organization's purpose.
111. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585 (1975).
112. Id. at 1587.
113. Id. at 1588.
114. Treas. Reg. 1.170A-I(g) (1983). See supra note 65.
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should not be allowed to take a deduction.115
Generally, no deductions are allowed to a taxpayer for contributions madeby another, even when the money which is given to the organization is provided by the taxpayer. 116 Applying this rule to the
instant case, the Whites should not have been allowed to take a tax deduction for expenses Lyle incurred in his contribution of services, even
if the expenses were paid by the Whites.
Judge Logan, writing the opinion of the court, reasoned that Rockefeller v. Commissioner 117 allowed the charitable contribution deduction. 18
In Rockefeller, the court permitted deductions for salaries taxpayers paid
to employees who were specifically hired and directed by the Rockefellers to provide services to charities which the Rockefellers supported.
This case, however, is readily distinguishable. Prior to hiring, the Rockefellers had no duty, legal or moral, to make such payments to the employees. Additionally, unlike Lyle, the employees did not incur any
personal expense. The only expense involved was the salaries contractually owed by the Rockefellers. 119 The Rockefellers did not receive any
120
benefit other than that which results from an act of generosity.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit in White v. United States12 1 allowed the taxpayers,
the Whites, to deduct as charitable contributions payments made directly to their Mormon missionary son for purposes of defraying his living expenses incurred while on his mission. The Whites' manner and
motive in making a charitable contribution did not conform with established principles governing charitable contributions. The granting of
tax deductions is a matter of legislative grace. Regardless of any equitable consideration, only when there is a clear statutory provision and
when such provision is followed can any particular deduction be al115. Lyle White, however, might be entitled to deduct his own expenses. See White, 514
F. Supp. at 1060 n.2.
116. In Herring v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 308, 312 (1976), the taxpayer sent his wife
funds for her support and their child's support while she was separated from the taxpayer.
The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to any deductions for charitable
contributions made by his wife to a church. In J. Morgan Wilson v. Commissioner, 52
T.C.M. (P-H) 52,046, a taxpayer who supported his mother sought to deduct as charitable contributions amounts contributed by his mother, from the allowance he gave her, to
various churches and charities. His mother was his dependent. The court disallowed the
deductions on the ground that the taxpayer had already received an allowance for the
deductions in the dependency exemption. The court held that ifa taxpayer makes a gift of
money to another person, and that person makes a gift to a church or charity, a deduction
is allowed to the person who makes the church contribution, but a deduction is not allowed to the taxpayer who supplied the funds.
117. 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982).
118. White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
119. The employees were not "donating" services as was Lyle. They were paid salaries
and thus were not performing voluntary services.
120. In fact, if the employees had been directed to perform business fuiclions, the
whole cost could presumably have been written off as a business expense. Thus, by directing the employees to perform services for charities, the Rockefellers suffered a loss.
121. 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984).
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lowed. 1 22 As the Supreme Court recognized: "While a taxpayer is free
to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so,
he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether contemplated or not. . . and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he
12 3
might have chosen to follow but did not."'
There is no practical reason why the Whites could not have donated
money directly to the Church's missionary fund.' 24 By donating the
money to a common fund, the Whites would have relinquished all control over the money, thereby clearly bringing the payment within section
170. It is irrelevant that the Church might choose to apply the funds in
the same manner as the taxpayer. 125 A taxpayer's primary purpose in
making a disinterested gift of generosity controls-not the application
of the contribution by the charity.
By making the gift to the church, the indefiniteness of bounty can
be assured. Intentions could not be questioned because the taxpayer
would have no control over disbursement of the funds, and thus would
have no expectation of any specific benefit beyond the satisfaction derived from the act of generosity. Only by conforming to this well-established model may Congress and the public be assured that such funds
will be used in a manner consistent with legislative intent.
Jay Shoemaker

122. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1973).
123. Id. at 149.
124. The Church argued that increased administrative costs would be involved. 725
F.2d at 1270. This is, however, just one of the costs of tax-exemption.
125. Davenport v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585, 1587 (1975); see also supra
note 111 and accompanying text.

